A2:
Experiments l1\3.y be performed only on those who freely and with understanding oonsent to participate in them.
A3:
Therefore, experiments may not be performed on animals.
The pro-researcher argument:
Rl: Human life is a higher form of life than animal life.
R2:
Experiments should be performed to preserve and enhance the quality of life of the higher life forms, even when this involves sacrificing the lives or quality of life of lesser life forms. R3: Therefore, experiments on animals to preserve or enhance the quality of human life should be performed.
Each of these arguments forms a tight little syllogism of which even Aristotle oould be proud. But are the premises reliable? That's where the issue lies in this dispute.
We shall question each in tUITl.
AI:
Animals cannot freely and with understanding give or withhold consent to participate in experiments.
This \IIOuld probably be considered the least oontroversial of the four claims I1\3.de in these argunents.
Nonetheless, it is not cbvi0us that animals lack the intellectual ability to give or withhold consent to participate in experiments. Certainly, in many cases, they clearly indicate their willingness or reluctance to participate to anyone willing to notice.
Consider the case of Professor Barnes, who wishes to determine whether nnnkeys can canbine various things in their environment to form a useful tool.
He puts sane bananas inside a cage but far enough away fran the bars so that the rocmkeys outside cannot reach them.
He then puts several short sticks which can be fitted together to form one long stick outside the cage and watches to see whether the rocmkeys, after realizing that they cannot reach the bananas either with just their arms or with just one stick, will put the sticks together to form a stick long enough to reach the bananas.
The IOOnkeys native to the region have long since becane accustaned to the research station, wander into the cernpound each lOOrning in search of food and entertainment, and, this lOOming, are soon engaged in trying to get the banana., so alluringly out of reach inside the big cage.
Consider also the case of Professor Jacobs, who is engaged in a series of sleep deprivation experiments involving cats. These experiments require that electrodes be placed into the cats' brains, that the cats be placed in a restraining apparatus, and that they be hooked up to a roonitoring device which delivers painful shocks to them whenever they start to fall asleep.
When Prof. Jaoobs canes to the colony to get one of the cats for an experiment, the cats all o:::Mer and crawl into the far corners of their
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cipate in experiments. Certainly, in many cases, they clearly indicate their willingness or reluctance to participate to anyone willing to notice.
The pro-animal argument:
California State University, Hayward
In the oontroversy ooncerning animal research, perhaps the following argunents represent the extreme positions: SOME REFLECTIONS ON ANIMAL RESEARCH AI: Animals cannot freely and with understanding give or withhold oonsent to participate in experiments.
A2:
A3:
R2:
Experiments should be performed to preserve and enhance the quality of life of the higher life forms, even when this involves sacrificing the lives or quality of life of lesser life forms.
R3: Therefore, experiments on animals to preserve or enhance the quality of human life should be performed.
AI:
When Prof. Jaoobs canes to the colony to get one of the cats for an experiment, the cats all o:::Mer and crawl into the far corners of their This \IIOuld probably be considered the least oontroversial of the four claims I1\3.de in these argunents.
Nonetheless, it is not cbvi0us that animals lack the intellectual ability to give or withhold consent to parti-
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When the professor opens one of the cages, that cat hisses and strikes out at him, which is why Prof. Jacobs has taken to wearing long, protective gloves when handling these cats.
Q1 the way to the laboratory, the cats continually attempt to escape.
Do the I1xmkeys who try to get Professor Barnes' bananas consent to participate in that experiment?
Do the cats who try to escape fran Professor Jacobs withhold consent?
It is clear in the second case that the cats, by their behavior, indicate that they desire not to participate in the sleep deprivation experiments.
Given the chance, they would "vote with their feet" and leave the good professor behind. But can this contrary behavior be sensibly interpreted as the cats withholding their consent to participate in the experiments? Based on the standard requirements for informed consent when dealing with human research subjects, we may be inclined to say "no." Since cats cannot understand the experiments in which they are to participate, they cannot formulate informed judgments to participate or not to participate in the research.
lbwever, that conclusion would overlook the fact that understanding is not sanething that exists by itself; it is always saneone's understanding. So, when we say that the cats do not understand the experiments, what we mean is that they do not understand them iT. the way Professor Jacobs does.
But while that is doubtless true, it does not follow that the cats do not understand the experiments at all or that they do not understand them in the way required to give or withhold consent.
It is clear that Professor Jacobs' cats must understand the experiments in sane way; otherwise, they would not be hissing and attempting to escape.
Furtherrrore, even anong humans, to be capable of g~V1l1g or withholding consent does not require that one understand the experiment in the way the researcher does.
All that is required is that one be sane and understand how the experiment will (likely) affect him/her. cats seeking to escape fran the torments of sleep deprivation research would seem to be expressing a sane, reasonable understanding of how the experiments will affect them. Indeed, if the cats did not behave in this way in this circumstance, we would be inclinffi to say that "they don't know what's going to happen to them" or that they had entered a state of psychotic depression. Consequently, it makes sense to say that Prof. Jacobs' cats, through their contrary behavior, are withholding consent to participate in his research.
What about Professor Barnes' rronkeys? They are free to roam in and out of the ccmpound, and we may also preSlIDle that they have not been starved nor are otherwise desperate for food. So, they have not been c0-erced into participating in the experiment. Furtherrrore, the rronkeys understand what the situation holds for them, namely, bananas, if they can figure out how to get them, disappointment, if they cannot. Prof. Barnes has a rrore expansive understanding of the situation, including the contribution the experiment could make to "science" and his career, but these extra dimensions of the situation do not affect the rronkeys' capacity to act as sane, reasonably self-interested agents in consenting to participate or not to participate in the experiment.
As long as the rronkeys are aware of what is happening to them during the experiment and as long as they are free to withdraw fran the experiment whenever they do not like what is happening to them, it would be reasonable to say that their participation in the experiment is an expression of consent to participate. This interpretation is analogous to Soorates' oftrepeated claim that merely by living in a free society we agree to the social contract.
Animals signing consent forms may be a joke, but animals giving or withholding consent to participate in an experiment is not absurd. Q1 the contrary, it is carm:m, easily reoognized, and often well-i.nformed and reasonable, fran the animals' point of view, which, where consent is the issue, is the Viewpoint that counts. I t follows that A1 is false. The problem with applying the consent requirement to animal research is not that the animals are incapable of giving or withholding consent.
The problem is merely that researchers do not want to be frustrated by animals refusing to participate in their experiments.
A2:
Experiments may be performed only on those who freely and with understanding consent to participate in them.
Although still deeply resented by many
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Q1 the way to the laboratory, the cats continually attempt to escape. that "they don't know what's going to happen to them" or that they had entered a state of psychotic depression. Consequently, it makes sense to say that Prof. Jacobs' cats, through their contrary behavior, are withholding consent to participate in his research.
Although still deeply resented by many Animals signing consent forms may be a joke, but animals giving or withholding consent to participate in an experiment is not absurd. Q1 the contrary, it is carm:m, easily reoognized, and often well-i.nformed and reasonable, fran the animals' point of view, which, where consent is the issue, is the Viewpoint that counts. I t follows that A1 is false. The problem with applying the consent requirement to animal research is not that the animals are incapable of giving or withholding consent.
All that is required is that one be sane and understand how the experiment will (likely) affect him/her. cats seeking to escape fran the torments of sleep deprivation research would seem to be expressing a sane, reasonable understanding of how the experiments will affect them. Indeed, if the cats did not behave in this way in this circumstance, we would be inclinffi to say
A2:
Experiments may those who freely and consent to participate be performed only on with understanding in them.
---researchers, the requirerrent that people be adequately infmne:i and freely a:rnsent before becaning research subjects has becane a standard part of the ethics governing research with human subjects.
'!bere are bo.u reasons for this requirement.
(be is the many horrible experiments that "scientists" have inflicted on defenceless or unwitting research subjects. Not only Nazi experiments but also experiments perfonned in this country an prisoners, the retarded or mentally ill, racial minorities, and the poor have outraged the PJblic and shown the need to protect people against callous, unscrupulous, and overzealous researchers.
'!be other reason for the oonsent requiremellt is our belief that individuals should, as far as possible, be free to direct their lives acoording to their own values. People' s lives should not be oontrolled by others who think "they know best," since what looks the best to them may not be the best for saneone who has different values.
For example, to a physician camti.tted to preserving life at all costs, remaining alive on a dialysis machine may "obviously" be the best thing for saneone suffering fran kidney failure. But the persan actually having to live such a life may not find it of sufficient quality to be worth the trouble.
The oldfashioned "doctor knows best" paternalism would have left the decision to the doctor. Our new respect for self-determination has fostered the requirement of consent to counter-balance paternalism and to insure that we all have the opportunity to pursue our lives according to our own values (provided we acoord others the same freedan).
Hopefully, the informed consent requirerrent is working to reduce the number of research abuses of human subjects.
However, it does not prevent doing research with human subjects who have not consented to participate in the research.
If a person has a legal guardian, that guardian may consent for his/her ward to participate. 'Ibis can happen when a person is judged to have lost oontact with reality, as in mental illness, to be tmable to make a decision, as when one is in a cana, to be tmable to weigh the lcng-range benefits, as with children, or when the individual does not yet have his/her own values, as with infants.
In such cases, "paternalism" is not a dirty word.
As lcng as the guardian does what he/she believes his/her ward would want or what would be in the ward •s best interest, such cu'!pz"anises of the principle of self-determination are not only morally acceptable but necessary to provide the individual the help needed to attain or return to the condition where he/she can take control of his/her own life.
It follows that A2 is not an accurate statement of current research ethics ooncerning human subjects. Non-consenting individuals may be research subjects, if they are tmable to recognize and evaluate the benefits (for them) to be attained fran the research and if they have a guardian who decides that participating in the research will be in their best interest (or will, at least, cause them no hann).
Just as this exemption opens the door for therapeutic research an humans without their oonsent, so it would leave open the door for therapeutic research on animals. 'Ibis is the way things ought to be.
Recall that the reason for insisting on infonned oonsent is to protect individuals against abuse. It would be an abuse of that ooncern to make of the oonsent requirerrent an unbending principle which prevents those incapable of assessing the possible lang-range benefits (for themselves) of a procedure fran benefitting fran research.
It follows that A2 would not (other things being equal) be a desirable moral reform of our current research codes , either.
While our oonclusion must be that neither of the premises of the pro-animal argument is oorrect and, oonsequently, that the argument is unsound, we may note that honoring the reasons why Al and A2 are incorrect would p..1t an end to virtually all animal research.
Animals who rebel against research are virtually never resisting scmething that is for their own long-term benefit. Usually, what they fear and seek to escape is all the experiment and the future hold for them, namely, illIprisorooont, pain, torment, and death.
No sane, ccrnprehending individual would agree to participate in most animal research, and no responsible guardian would agree to allow his/her ward to participate in that research.
So, acknowledging that animals can give or withhold a:rnsent to participate in an experiment and. that their withholding a:rnsent can be overridden for their own good would perm.it only animal research which is pleasant for, innocuous to, BRlWEEN THE SPECIES 20 researchers, the requirerrent that people be adequately infmne:i and freely a:rnsent before becaning research subjects has becane a standard part of the ethics governing research with human subjects.
As lcng as the BRlWEEN THE SPECIES   20 guardian does what he/she believes his/her ward would want or what would be in the ward •s best interest, such cu'!pz"anises of the principle of self-determination are not only morally acceptable but necessary to provide the individual the help needed to attain or return to the condition where he/she can take control of his/her own life.
It follows that A2 is not an accurate statement of current research ethics ooncerning human subjects. Non-consenting individuals may be research subjects, if they are tmable to recognize and evaluate the benefits (for them) to be attained fran the research ---and if they have a guardian who decides that participating in the research will be in their best interest (or will, at least, cause them no hann).
Just as this exemption opens the door for therapeutic research an humans without their oonsent, so it would leave open the door for therapeutic research on animals. 'Ibis is the way things ought to be. Recall that the reason for insisting on infonned oonsent is to protect individuals against abuse. It would be an abuse of that ooncern to make of the oonsent requirerrent an unbending principle which prevents those incapable of assessing the possible lang-range benefits (for themselves) of a procedure fran benefitting fran research.
So, acknowledging that animals can give or withhold a:rnsent to participate in an experiment and. that their withholding a:rnsent can be overridden for their own good would perm.it only animal research which is pleasant for, innocuous to, or beneficial for the animals themselves.
Rl:
Human life is a higher foun of life than animal life.
No foun of life is intrinsically higher or lower than any other--that is a logical truism.
Sanething can be higher or rrore valuable or rrore wortl.y or superior to sanething else cnly when measured against some starrlard.
What is the starrlard here, and what should it be?
'!he usual standard is intellectual ability.
For whatever Freudian reasons, the ability to employ reason to control one's life and surrot.mdings has traditionally been =nsidered the rrark of human superiority. IOOeed, it has even been called the image of God, the Creator and controller of the universe, in humans.
But while it seems true enough that humans are, ordinarily, rrore intellectual than other animals, it is not at all clear that this is a rrorally significant difference.
Especially when we view this issue in tenns of the analogy to God the Creator, it seems to follow that what we are talking about is our ability to daninate and control. Citing that ability as our rrorally crucial superiority to other animals suggests that the pro-researcher argumant rests on the claim that those who are strong enough to exploit others are for that very reason justified in doing so.I f that~what is being argued, the pro-researcher argt1IreIlt is an instance of the "might makes right" fbiloSOPly--hardly a IlX)rally canpelling p:Jsition.
'!here is another, lI'Ore credible interpretation of the lI'Oral relevance of intellectual superiority: a rroral agent is sUpp:Jsed to be one who acts out of respect for impersonal laws, and it requires reason to recognize such laws, counter-balance selfish feelings, and do the rrorally right thing. However, while this Kantian view of the rroral significance of reason is superior to the previous, Machiavellian account, it is clearly exaggerated. Kant's claim that acting out of a sense of duty is the only rroral rrotive is mistaken.
Loving parents are rrorally estimable; indeed, they are rrorally rrore estimable than "dutiful parents," a Iilrase which usually damns with faint praise.
An adequate IlX)ral theory ITUlSt (at least) make roan for rroral sentiments alongside rroral reasoning.
But once we open this door for sentiment to enter the rroral arena, it is not at all obvious that instinctual and conditioned actions which are intentional and sincere resp:Jnses to the needs of others should not count as rroral actions and those who do them as rroral agents.
For example, are we to say that a rrother bird who feigns a broken wing and risks her life to distract a fox fran her nest is not worthy of rroral acclaim because she acts on maternal instinct, rather than by judging her maxim to be one she could will as a tmiversal law?
What about a human rrother who instinctively rushes into a burning house to save her baby; ITUlSt she subscribe to the categorical imperative in order to merit rroral acclaim?
Of course not. Whether bird or human, being a devoted rrother is a rroral virtue, and this is an evaluation based on the IlX)ther's self-sacrificing aommitment to her child, rather than on her capacity for abstract reasoning.
'!hus, we cannot so blithely dismiss loyal dogs, courageous lions, self-sacrificing p:rrents of a wide variety of species, rronogarrous wolves, resourceful beavers, and the like as not being rroral agents because they are "merely creatures of instinct." Seeing virtue in other animals is not anthrop:rrorphizing, unless we preS1.llre that they do their virtuous deeds as a result of the same intellectual process we have to employ when 21 BE:IWEEN THE SPECIES or beneficial for the animals themselves.
What is the starrlard here, and what should it be? '!he usual standard is intellectual ability.
For whatever Freudian reasons, the ability to employ reason to control one's life and surrot.mdings has traditionally been r;onsidered the rrark of human superiority. IOOeed, it has even been called the image of God, the Creator and controller of the universe, in humans.
Especially when we view this issue in tenns of the analogy to God the Creator, it seems to follow that what we are talking about is our ability to daninate and control. Citing that ability as our rrorally crucial superiority to other animals suggests that the pro-researcher argtlIOOnt rests on the claim that those who are strong enough to 21 exploit others are for that very reason justified in doing so.I f that~what is being argued, the pro-researcher argt1IreIlt is an instance of the "might makes right" fbiloSOPly--hardly a IlX)rally canpelling p:Jsition.
Loving parents are rrorally estimable; indeed, they are rrorally rrore estimable than "dutiful parents," a Iilrase which usually damns with faint praise. An adequate IlX)ral theory ITUlSt (at least) make roan for rroral sentiments alongside rroral reasoning.
'!hus, we cannot so blithely dismiss loyal dogs, courageous lions, self-sacrificing p:rrents of a wide variety of species, rronogarrous wolves, resourceful beavers, and the like as not being rroral agents because they are "merely creatures of instinct." Seeing virtue in other animals is not anthrop:rrorphizing, unless we preS1.llre that they do their virtuous deeds as a result of the same intellectual process we have to employ when our social instincts fail us and we have to canbat our lesser, selfish selves. However, just as there is no reason to suppose other animals go through this process, so there is no rroral need for making such a presumption. What makes an action an expression of rroral agency is not that the agent had to put his/her internal house in order in order to overcome temptation and do what is right. For an action to be an expression of rroral agency, all that is required is that it be done intentionally and sincerely in response to what the agent perceives to be the need of another.
The actions of rrany animals appear to be such expressions.
'Ihe belief that we are rroral agents and other animals are not is likely just an expression of our awn species prejudice, and rationalistic rooral pulosopues are merely attempts to rationalize that prejudice.
If
we are \TOrally superior to other animals, it JID..lSt be a question of degree, and given our particularly bloody, destructive, exploitative habits and history, that question must, at best, be considered open. Given our species prejudice, we may even question whether we are capable of sufficient impartiality to attempt an unbiased answer to. that question.
'Ihe other traditional standard of rroral superiority of relevance here is the ability to feel various pleasures and pains.
It has been claimed. that humans are capable of feeling pleasures and pains of a greater variety and subtlety than other animals, and that since the fundamental goal of rrorality is to maximize the excess of pleasure over pain in the world, we are justified in sacrificing less sensitive beings in order to benefit the rrore sensitive.
Of course, we might respond that we could equally well increase the excess of pleasure over pain by sacrificing those beings who are rrore sensitive to pain in order to benefit the less sensitive, but we will not be so impertinent. Instead, we will simply ask if it is so clear that humans are \TOre sensitive to pleasure and pain than other animals.
Can we enjoy the life of a dog, a bird, a bat, or a porpoise~ can we appreciate the subtleties of smell, sight, sound, and touch which these animals can apparently appreciate?
Perhaps they cannot appreciate Michelangelo and l-bzart (an insensitivity, let us not forget, not limited to members of other species), but that these are regarded as superior pleasures by (sane of) us does not show that they are superior to the pleasures of other animals.
John Stuart Mill, the great champion of qualitative differences arrong pleasures and pains, acknowledges that the only way to determine which are the superior pleasures is to find scrneone who can appreciate the lot and ask him/her which ones he/she prefers. That is impossible here; for even Jclm Stuart cannot know the pleasures of the gull and the dolphin.
Consequently, as befits such a determinedly egalitarian and evidenced rroral pulosoj:i:ly, utilitarianism must reject this effete basis for saying that one sentient life form is superior to another.
other utilitarians of a rrore Benthamite stripe, such as Peter Singer, claim that hurnans are capable of a greater arrount of pleasure and pain than other animals because we are capable of projecting the future and remembering the past to a vastly greater degree than other animals.
'!his ability makes it possible for us to experience the pleasures and pains of such feelings as hope and regret, feelings those of lesser temporal capacity cannot experience•• However, even if this is true, it may also be true that the present pleasures and pains of other animals are roore intense than ours because they are not diluted by thoughts of the past or future.
If that is the case, the extra intensity of their pleasures and pains might rrore than outweigh the extra pleasures and pains our extensive temporal capacity provides us. Of course, once again, there is no way of telling whether the pleasures and pains of other animals are rrore intense than our awn and, if so, whether that greater intensity is sufficient to outweigh the greater extent of our pleasures and pains. Thus, this Benthamite version of human superiority encounters the same sort of problem as the Millian version and must suffer the same fate.
'!here could, of course, be an eOOless line of suggestions for the standard which shows that humans are superior to other forms of life, but we shall stop with these two. 'Illey are the rrorally relevant standards, and with these two the issue is open and must remain open, since there appears to be no non-arbitrary way of telling which species is the roost rroral or sensitive. It follows that when interpreted in a \TOrally relevant way, Rl cannot be justified.
If that is the case, the extra intensity of their pleasures and pains might rrore than outweigh the extra pleasures and pains our extensive temporal capacity provides us. Of course, once again, there is no way of telling whether the pleasures and pains of other animals are rrore intense than our awn and, if so, whether that greater intensity is sufficient to outweigh the greater extent of our pleasures and pains. Thus, this Benthamite version of human superiority encounters the same sort of problem as the Millian version and must suffer the same fate. our social instincts fail us and we have to canbat our lesser, selfish selves. However, just as there is no reason to suppose other animals go through this process, so there is no rroral need for making such a presumption. What makes an action an expression of rroral agency is not that the agent had to put his/her internal house in order in order to overcome temptation and do what is right. For an action to be an expression of rroral agency, all that is required is that it be done intentionally and sincerely in response to what the agent perceives to be the need of another.
Can we enjoy the life of a dog, a bird, a bat, or a porpoise~can we appreciate the subtleties of smell, sight, sound, and touch which these animals can apparently appreciate?
Perhaps they cannot appreciate Michelangelo and l-bzart (an insensitivity, let us not forget, not limited to members of other species), but that these are regarded as superior pleasures us does not show that they are the pleasures of other animals. The utilitarian concern in research, as elsewhere, is to maximize benefit and minimize suffering and to do so without prejudice, i.e., without favoring the interests of one group over those of another group in balancing the pleasures against the pains. Consequently, the principle of utility does not reccmnend that we structure our experiments so that "lower" orders are sacrificed for the benefit of "higher" orders.
Rather, it <nmJaIlds us to structure experiments in a way which will involve the greatest benefit and the least suffering altogether.
This imperative poses a serious IOOral obstacle to current animal research procedures, since they involve sacrificing tens of millions of healthy animals. This sacrifice involves adding greatly to the annunt of suffering in the world and, finally, when these animals are killed, eliminates the possibility of tens of millions of happy lives fran the positive side of the utilitarian ledger. Intuitively, the precept which would best meet the utilitarian concern is that research should be restricted to:
experiments which do not cause suffering, (ii) experiments conducted on those who already suffer frem the malady in question, (iii) experiments which are cxxnpensated with a reward of happiness for the research subjects which IOOre than outweighs the sacrifice involved in the experiment, and (iv) experiments which require iIrlividual sacrifices as the only kncMn way for attaining clear and present, significant group benefits.
Restricting research in these ways would hold out the prospect of alleviating suffering in ways which do not create additional misery or loss, unless they are necessary for and outweighed by sane clear and present good. This is what utilitarians, and, I should think, all IOOral people, IlU.lst prefer.
Thus, if we approach the issue frem either a Kantian or a utilitarial1 perspective, designing experiments to sacrifice supposedly lower life fonns in order to benefit supposedly higher life forms, i.e., ourselves, is IOOrally disrep.1table. Experiments IlU.lSt be justified on the grounds that they are fair to all concerned and that they are likely to make the world a happier place, and these justifications provide no grounds for our securing our own happiness by des- The utilitarian concern in research, as elsewhere, is to maximize benefit and minimize suffering and to do so without prejudice, i.e., without favoring the interests of one group over those of another group in balancing the pleasures against the pains. Consequently, the principle of utility does not reccmnend that we structure our experiments so that "lower" orders are sacrificed for the benefit of "higher" orders.
experiments which do not cause suffering,
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(ii) experiments conducted on those who already suffer frem the malady in question, (iii) experiments which are cxxnpensated with a reward of happiness for the research subjects which IOOre than outweighs the sacrifice involved in the experiment, and (iv) experiments which require iIrlividual sacrifices as the only kncMn way for attaining clear and present, significant group benefits.
Thus, if we approach the issue frem either a Kantian or a utilitarial1 perspective, designing experiments to sacrifice supposedly lower life fonns in order to benefit supposedly higher life forms, i.e., ourselves, is IOOrally disrep.1table. Experiments IlU.lSt be justified on the grounds that they are fair to all concerned and that they are likely to make the world a happier place, and these justifications provide no grounds for our securing our own happiness by des-troying the happiness of others. Thus, R2 is continued from page 9 at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral conan end in itself, although when Kant, alas, cerns, justice and happiness. Consequently, approved an neither premise of the pro-researcher arguethic forbidding utilization of a sentient creature as an object rather than as ment is morally justified. -Hall, 1976) . clear and present opportunity for making the world a happier place and ImlSt be roade acJean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1762) (Pacording to principles which insure that the ris: Garnier, 1957) . sacrifices are borne fairly by all those likely to benefit fran the experiment. Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalite (Paris:
GarnierIf these principles were adopted and Flammarion, 1971). enforced, the abuses of animals which concern proponents of the pro-animal argument could Henry S. Salt, An.i.mals' Rights (Clarks be eliminated without canpranising the prosSurrrnit: Society for Animal Rights, 1980). pect of continued advances in knowledge which concern proponents of the pro-researcher Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique argument.
(Paris: Garnier, 1954).
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Conclusion
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would prohibit all research with animals, is unsound, but so is the pro-researcher argument, which would pennit any experiment on animals which might benefit humms.
The reasons against these arguments suggest the following positive conclusions:
continued from page 9 an end in itself, although when Kant, alas, approved an ethic forbidding utilization of a sentient creature as an object rather than as declared that ''man can have no duty to any beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly that at that point they would have parted <Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philoso-];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that proposition "revolting and abaninable." EDITIOOS Q)NSULTED (i ) Fundarnentally, there should be just one set of moral principles concerning research, rather than one set for experiments on hwnans and another, weaker set for experiments on non-humms.
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) .
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1762) (Paris: Garnier, 1957 Garnierl'origine de l 'inegalite Flammarion, 1971) . If these principles were adopted and enforced, the abuses of animals which concern proponents of the pro-animal argument could be eliminated without canpranising the prospect of continued advances in knowledge which concern proponents of the pro-researcher argument.
(ii) Experimental sacrifices must be limited to situations in which there is a clear and present opportunity for making the world a happier place and ImlSt be roade according to principles which insure that the sacrifices are borne fairly by all those likely to benefit fran the experiment.
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